


# SRI LANKA

**Capital:** Colombo  
**Population:** 22,409,381  
**GDP per capita (PPP):** \$12,800  
**Human Development Index:** High (0.770)  
**Freedom in the World:** Partly Free (56/100)

## OVERALL CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.6



2017 marked two years since the historic election of President Maithripala Sirisena. Sirisena ran on a good governance platform and defeated the incumbent Mahinda Rajapaksa, whose ten-year term was characterized by a highly restrictive environment for civil society. While the Sirisena presidency expanded civic space and media freedom, there are concerns that reforms to promote democracy and protect human rights have stalled.

The coalition government formed between the United National Front for Good Governance (UNFGG), led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, and the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA), led by President Sirisena, continued to struggle with internal competition between its two centers of power. Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) remained divided between Sirisena supporters and supporters of former President Rajapaksa. This faction, along with other members outside the SLFP, constitutes the informal Joint Opposition (JO) in the parliament. The JO has been at the forefront of major opposition campaigns that have hindered progress on the good governance agenda, especially on constitutional reform, economic policy, and post-war reconciliation.

Sri Lanka's political environment was volatile in 2017. Nine ministerial appointments were replaced in May 2017, the first Cabinet reshuffle since the 2015 general election. The reshuffle included a swap of positions between the minister of finance and the minister of foreign affairs, amid corruption allegations against Minister of Finance Ravi Karunanayake. Karunanayake eventually resigned from his new post as minister of foreign affairs in August 2017. His resignation took place during a highly publicized investigation by a Presidential Commission of Inquiry into a 2015 auction of treasury bonds by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

There was slight improvement in Sri Lanka's ranking on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index in 2017. Sri Lanka moved from 95<sup>th</sup> to 91<sup>st</sup> position, although it is still significantly lower than it was following the election of the current government on an anti-corruption platform (83<sup>rd</sup>). The Right to Information (RTI) Act, No. 12 of 2016, became operational in February 2017. The RTI Act grants Sri Lankan citizens the right of

access to information in the possession, custody, or control of public authorities, thus promoting government transparency. CSOs successfully used the RTI Act to support advocacy campaigns in 2017. Another improvement in governance was the enactment of the Local Authorities Elections (Amendment) Act, No. 16 of 2017, which mandates a 25 percent quota for women's representation in local government bodies. CSOs advocated actively in favor of this Act. Meanwhile, the Office on Missing Persons (OMP) Act, No. 14 of 2016 became operational in September 2017; however, by the end of the year, President Sirisena had not yet appointed OMP's seven members.

The government's legislative proposals relating to law and order continued to pose threats to fundamental rights. Despite opposition from CSOs, the government once again introduced in parliament amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure Act (CCPA) that would effectively deny suspects the right to access legal counsel at the point of arrest. These amendments were previously submitted in 2016 and then withdrawn due to CSO resistance. Meanwhile, the draft Counter Terrorism Act, also heavily opposed in 2016, was revised and submitted to the Parliamentary Sectoral Oversight Committee on National Security in 2017. The draft Act provides for a broad definition of terrorism-related offenses. For example, a person may be held responsible when his or her acts were known or reasonably believed to adversely affect the "unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty, national security or defense of Sri Lanka," which could be used to suppress a wide range of CSO advocacy.

Constitutional reform efforts reached a stalemate in 2017. The Steering Committee of the Constitutional Assembly presented its Interim Report in September, but actual legislation was not introduced in the parliament. Meanwhile, the JO dominated debate on constitutional reform, alleging that the proposed reform represented a conspiracy to displace the status of Buddhism and drive a separatist agenda to divide the country. The government and other pro-reform actors have had limited success in challenging these criticisms. Within the governing coalition, the SLFP announced that it would not support far-reaching constitutional reforms—including those related to power sharing—where such reforms require a national referendum.

The government made limited progress in post-war reconciliation and accountability in 2017. Furthermore, for the first time under the current government, significant anti-Muslim violence broke out, destroying dozens of Muslim-owned homes and businesses in Gintota in November.

CSO sustainability did not change significantly in 2017. The legal environment deteriorated due to delays in the registration process and the rise in state harassment of CSOs and activists. CSO advocacy also showed some decline due to the volatile political context, which impacted progress on key reform efforts relating to transitional justice and constitutional reform. Moreover, government attempts to pass regulations that would curtail democratic space weakened cooperation between CSOs and government. The public image of CSOs declined due to increased hostility towards CSOs by prominent state actors. On the other hand, financial viability showed some improvement due to increased donor funding, particularly for peacebuilding and community rehabilitation projects.

The National Secretariat for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO Secretariat) maintains a directory of NGOs registered under the Voluntary Social Service Organizations (Registration and Supervision) Act, No. 31 of 1980 (VSSO Act). As of December 2017, the directory listed 1,469 NGOs, a slight increase from the 1,452 NGOs listed in 2016. This Act covers a range of other organizations besides NGOs, but there are no updated statistics available on these other types of organizations. There is no reliable data on the number of unregistered CSOs in Sri Lanka.


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## LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.2

The legal environment for CSOs deteriorated in 2017 due to delays in the registration process, increasing state harassment of CSOs, and proposals to amend the VSSO Act.

CSOs in Sri Lanka can register through one of six legal instruments: the Societies Ordinance of 1891; the Companies Act of 2007; the Trust Ordinance of 1917; the Co-operative Societies Act of 1992; the VSSO Act

of 1980; and an Act of Parliament sponsored by a member of parliament through a private member's bill. The multiplicity of applicable laws and the lack of clear guidelines on the registration process result in significant uncertainty for CSOs. Regardless of the category of registration, most CSOs must also register as voluntary social service organizations (VSSOs) under the VSSO Act. The Act defines a VSSO as "any organization formed by a group of persons on a voluntary basis" that is either (a) of non-governmental nature; (b) dependent on public contributions or donations (local or foreign); or (c) set up with the objective of providing relief services to the mentally and physically disabled, the poor, the sick, orphans, and post-disaster relief. CSOs that operate within a single administrative division do not have to register under the VSSO Act or the other laws applicable to CSOs. Instead, they can receive approval to operate through a registration permit granted by the relevant local authority.



Registration under the VSSO Act is free of charge and takes approximately three months to complete. CSOs must pay registration fees to register as companies limited by guarantee under the Companies Act or as trusts under the Trusts Ordinance. A recently identified problem in the registration process is that local banks are exercising additional scrutiny before permitting newly formed CSOs to open bank accounts, impeding their ability to commence operations.

The NGO Secretariat under the Ministry of National Co-Existence, Dialogue and Official Languages is responsible for CSO oversight. In 2017, the NGO Secretariat disseminated a notice requiring CSOs to submit action plans, audited

financial reports, annual reports, financial statements, and staff details as the NGO Secretariat was updating its monitoring mechanisms. Although the notice did not include any reference to the Secretariat's legal authority to ask for this information, most CSOs complied with this requirement since, according to the notice, those that did not would be listed as "inactive organizations."

If a CSO wishes to employ a foreign national, it is required to obtain clearance from the Ministry of Defense before the employee can be granted a work permit. When recruiting foreign nationals, CSOs working on rights-based issues are typically subjected to a greater level of scrutiny than service-oriented organizations.

The VSSO Act does not provide clear guidelines on internal management, financial reporting, or dissolution of CSOs. The Act permits the NGO Secretariat to take interim control of CSOs suspected of fraud and misappropriation. In 2017, then Minister of Justice Wijeyadasa Rajapakse called for stronger regulation of CSOs that posed "a threat to national interests." During this time period, the government also engaged in a process to amend the current VSSO Act to strengthen state regulation of CSOs. A number of prominent CSOs, such as the Center for Policy Alternatives and Sarvodaya, reported that they were excluded from the drafting process and expressed concern that the proposed amendments would negatively impact the operating space for CSOs.

CSOs operating in the North and East of Sri Lanka, such as Viluthu and the Families of the Disappeared, continued to face state scrutiny and surveillance in 2017. Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice conducted twenty-seven interviews with war-affected individuals and human rights activists in the North of Sri Lanka between January 2015 and November 2017. It found that state actors persistently used oppressive practices against CSOs operating in the North. Activists engaging international bodies to increase domestic accountability for human rights abuses also faced state harassment. Meanwhile, in 2017, state officials scrutinized the operating licenses of seventeen places of worship.

CSOs can legally generate income through the provision of goods and services. However, CSOs are not incentivized to charge for their goods and services as they do not receive tax exemptions on earned income.

CSOs are allowed to legally compete for government contracts at the local and central levels, but generally lack the organizational and financial capacities needed to compete effectively against private sector suppliers.

Only CSOs that provide rehabilitation, shelter, or employment services to persons with disabilities are eligible for tax exemptions. Under the Inland Revenue Act of 2006, all other CSOs must pay an income tax of 0.3 percent on all income received from grants, donations, and contributions.

Sri Lanka lacks lawyers specialized in CSO law. However, lawyers continue to provide general legal assistance to CSOs, primarily in Colombo.

## ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.6

CSOs' organizational capacity remained unchanged in 2017, although CSOs demonstrated increasing capacity to use social media to build informal constituencies. At the same time, they continued to struggle with human resource management and internal governance.

In 2017, CSOs continued to build informal constituencies on issues such as environmental protection, women's rights and political representation, transitional justice, and trade union activities. CSOs such as Hashtag Generation continued to successfully use social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter to build constituencies for reform. For example, online constituencies were built to support the amendment of the Muslim Marriages and Divorce Act (MMDA) to increase the minimum age of marriage to eighteen years, amend discriminatory divorce provisions, and permit women to be appointed as Quazis (judicial officers). Online constituencies also supported efforts to block regressive reform proposals, such as the draft Independent Council for News Media Standards Bill, which threatened press freedom.

Strategic planning among CSOs remained inconsistent in 2017. While larger urban-based CSOs often have clearly defined missions and engage in strategic planning, such practices are rare for smaller CSOs operating in rural areas. Even when CSOs have strategic plans, many fail to apply them when implementing their activities. Moreover, CSOs often rely heavily on the strategic visions and decision making of their founders, limiting the use of strategic planning in practice.

Most Sri Lankan CSOs lack internal management structures that separate roles and responsibilities between management and the board of directors, with board members often performing executive functions. The RTI Act considers CSOs as "public authorities" and therefore requires them to exercise transparency and make certain information publicly available. However, few CSOs have appointed information officers as required by the Act.

In 2017, retaining senior and well-trained staff was a challenge for both local and international CSOs, whereas previously this was an issue mainly for local CSOs. High staff turnover delayed the implementation of activities and limited the growth of organizational capacity across the sector. Staff shortages had a particularly adverse impact on smaller local CSOs. They had to rely on volunteers to conduct core activities, resulting in deficiencies in the quality and reliability of projects. Due to financial constraints, CSOs still did not prioritize the hiring of professionals, such as IT managers or accountants, in 2017.

Technical advancement of certain Colombo-based CSOs is high, and they actively use online platforms to build their constituencies and supplement their advocacy. For example, Groundviews—a citizen journalism website launched by the Center for Policy Alternatives—has over 92,000 followers on Twitter. It also has high levels of online engagement in English, as well as in Tamil and Sinhala on its respective platforms for those languages (Vikalpa and Maatram).




## FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.3

Financial viability improved in 2017. Private sector funding of CSOs increased as larger corporations aimed to contribute to the UN Sustainable Development Goals. For instance, the John Keells Foundation announced plans to allocate \$897,000 to CSOs working in community and livelihood development. Other large corporations such as the Commercial Bank of Ceylon and Unilever continued to fund CSOs through their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs.

International funding to Sri Lanka from donors such as USAID, the EU, and Australian Overseas Development Assistance, some of which is allocated for technical assistance to government and some for civil society, increased slightly during the year. USAID provided \$25 million in 2017, a slight increase from \$24 million in 2016. Australian Overseas Development Assistance provided \$22.3 million in 2016/2017, up slightly from \$21.5 million in 2015/2016. In November, the EU provided \$34 million to support a new five-year rural development program in the most vulnerable districts of the Central and Uva Provinces of Sri Lanka. Some donors have favorable relations with government counterparts and therefore prefer to work directly with the Sri Lankan government, decreasing the ability of local CSOs to benefit from donor funding. Moreover, governmental bodies that have missions and structures like CSOs, including the Secretariat to Coordinate Reconciliation Mechanisms (SCRM) and the Office of National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR), absorb donor funds that could otherwise go to CSOs.

Donor funding on issues such as peacebuilding and rights protection increased in 2017. For example, the UN Peacebuilding Fund allocated \$7 million for reconciliation and transitional justice—some of which will likely be granted to CSOs. CSOs providing services in former conflict areas in the North and East had relatively more



success in securing funding during the year. For example, the EU awarded approximately \$17 million to Habitat for Humanity and World Vision Sri Lanka for a multifaceted housing project in Kilinochchi. In contrast, service-oriented CSOs like Sarvodaya, which works nationwide, reported a decline in donor funding in 2017.

In certain instances, the decline in donor funding to service-oriented CSOs prompted an increase in income-generating activities. For example, the Family Planning Association, which is 95 percent self-sufficient, sells different types of contraceptives and provides services such as health checks and counselling at discounted rates. Although many CSOs are membership-based, only a few types

of organizations, such as faith-based organizations, trade unions, microfinance organizations, and provincial and district level clubs collect fees from members.

In certain sectors such as healthcare, CSOs receive funding from the government. For example, the Family Planning Association receives an annual grant from the Ministry of Health.

In 2017, CSOs made limited progress in attracting cash donations and in-kind contributions from their communities and constituencies. Fundraising initiatives by CSOs were limited to causes such as healthcare and early childhood development. For instance, Lion Ladies Association hosted a fundraiser for equipment needed by the Cancer Hospital and the National Hospital of Sri Lanka. CSOs still do not use information and communication technologies (ICTs) to raise funds.

Financial management systems are generally expensive to institute and maintain. Moreover, most local CSOs cannot afford to hire independent auditors. Therefore, with the exception of organizations that are donor funded, financial management systems remain weak across Sri Lanka's CSO sector.

CSO advocacy declined in 2017 due to growing negative sentiment against rights-oriented organizations and a difficult political context that hindered key reforms in areas such as transitional justice and constitutional reform. Key political leaders increasingly made remarks critical of civil society in 2017. For example, after Attorney-at-Law Lakshan Dias, who is connected to the National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka (NCEASL), discussed the number of attacks against Christian places of worship in a TV discussion, he was threatened with disbarment by the then minister of justice, leading him to leave the country for a period of time. In addition, the government largely disregarded CSO advocacy during the year. Finally, CSO advocacy efforts in 2017 were largely reactive, with CSOs failing to proactively conduct broad-based advocacy campaigns to shape the public agenda,


### ADVOCACY: 4.1

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Cooperation between CSOs and government remained limited in 2017. The twelve Open Government Partnership (OGP) commitments that the cabinet approved in late 2016 showed limited progress throughout 2017, despite CSO oversight and monitoring. The OGP's tracker of progress on commitments indicates that out of fifteen milestones under Sri Lanka's health commitment, nine are incomplete and six are stalled, while two of the three milestones under the education commitment are incomplete and the remaining one is stalled.

In 2017, CSOs were able to utilize the RTI Act to promote public accountability, both at the national and local levels. For example, when thirty-two people were killed following the collapse of a massive garbage dump in Meethotamulla in April 2017, Groundviews filed several RTI requests with key state authorities. The information obtained through the requests revealed that the authorities did not conduct an environmental impact assessment before selecting the site for waste collection. Transparency International Sri Lanka organized regional clinics around the country to help participants draft and file RTI requests in areas such as livelihood development, waste management, and admissions to leading public schools. Furthermore, Amara Forum, a grassroots organization based in the North, successfully filed RTI requests to publicize the criteria for the Samurdhi scheme, a state-sponsored social welfare program. Environmental CSOs such as the Environmental Foundation Limited (EFL), the Center for Environmental Justice, and the Rainforest Protectors of Sri Lanka increased the accountability of the Central Environmental Authority and Forest Department by filing RTI requests to obtain environmental impact assessments and other information related to large-scale development projects. In contrast, advocacy campaigns focused on anti-corruption were less widespread in 2017. Work in this area was limited to providing technical support to the government on prosecuting corruption, such as consulting on modes for asset recovery and tracing funds.

In 2017, women's groups launched successful advocacy campaigns to amend the MMDA and introduce a 25 percent quota for women in local government bodies.




On the MMDA, Women’s Action Network, Muslim Women Research Action Forum, and Muslim Personal Law Reform Action carried out campaigns and other advocacy activities, including meeting with stakeholders and making demands at national and international forums. In addition, they released a statement signed by over 300 individuals and organizations calling for reforms and the official release of the report of the committee appointed in 2009 to consider amendments to the MMDA. Women and Media Collective, Women’s Resource Center, Institute for Ethnic Studies (ICES), and other groups advocated for the 25 percent quota for women. They issued advocacy statements and submitted recommendations for adopting the quota in the law. In December, the government amended the Local Authorities Elections Ordinance, No. 53 of 1946, to provide for a guaranteed 25 percent quota for women in local government bodies, such as municipal councils and pradeshiya sabhas (divisional councils).

Coalition politics in the run-up to the local government elections of 2018 impeded the reform agenda and CSO advocacy and lobbying, especially in the areas of constitutional reform and transitional justice. However, sustained pressure by local CSOs and the international community was vital to achieving limited reforms related to transitional justice. For instance, the OMP Act was operationalized on September 15, 2017 after being dormant for more than a year since its enactment. Moreover, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances Bill was gazetted in February 2017.

Although there was limited progress in pursuing key reform initiatives in 2017, CSOs were successful in resisting state-driven reforms that threatened to erode democratic space. For instance, media organizations such as the Free Media Movement and Sri Lanka Working Journalists’ Association successfully prevented the enactment of the Independent Council for News Media Standards Bill by expressing concern about its potential impact on press freedoms and its opaque drafting process. Moreover, by publicizing their views in several news articles, CSOs managed to obstruct the enactment of a draconian counter-terrorism law as well as legislation designed to deny suspects access to counsel while in custody.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4**

Service provision remained the same in 2017. CSOs continued to provide a broad range of goods and services, including healthcare, housing, livelihood support, water, and education. For instance, in August 2017 Muslim Aid Sri Lanka provided permanent water pipe connections to thirty-five low income families in Trincomalee. CSOs working in the mental health field noted high demand for their services due to a gap in government services in this area.



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Several natural disasters had an adverse impact on local communities in 2017. Floods in the southwestern part of the country affected over 600,000 people, while prolonged drought in Gampaha, Monaragala, Kalutara, Trincomalee, and other areas impacted nearly two million people. National and regional CSOs mobilized volunteers, goods, and services to assist affected communities. For example, Sarvodaya took immediate measures to provide relief items through district centers.

Most CSOs cannot afford to conduct needs assessments to inform service provision. Smaller CSOs are better at aligning services to beneficiary needs because they tend to work in close proximity to the communities they serve.

In 2017, CSOs continued to provide goods and services to recipients beyond their membership. For example, HelpAge Sri Lanka, an NGO committed to improving the quality of life of the aging population, organized 136 Mobile Medical and Eye Care Unit (MMU) camps across the nation, serving 15,096 senior citizens.

Moreover, in 2017 the Rotary Club of Colombo provided 3,000 pairs of glasses to low-income individuals. CSOs rely on donor funding and generally offer their goods and services free of charge.

CSOs receive little recognition from national or local government for their service provision. However, government officials continued to contract with CSOs for specialized support services in 2017. For instance, CSOs provided technical support for prosecuting corruption, and conducted workshops on RTI implementation.

## SECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector did not change in 2017. Sri Lanka still lacks permanent resource centers that provide CSOs with training and technical support. Newly formed CSOs noted challenges in seeking information on the CSO registration process, regulation, and activity planning.


In 2017, local grant-making organizations such as the Neelan Tiruchelvam Trust continued to provide funding to strengthen CSOs' ability to address current and emerging issues in the areas of gender, ethnicity, and religious minorities.

In 2017, CSOs formed issue-based coalitions to promote women's political representation, and to oppose regressive legislation on press freedom and custodial rights. Additionally, the Inter-University Students' Federation (IUSF) and Government Medical Officers' Association (GMOA) formed coalitions to protest the privatization of higher education, specifically targeting the private South Asian Institute of Technology and Medicine (SAITM). However, issue-based coalitions are often loosely organized and have a lifespan that is limited to the achievement of their immediate objectives, such as the passage or withdrawal of legislation. Sri Lanka lacks formal coalitions that advocate for sustained improvements in particular thematic areas such as human rights protection or access to justice. Furthermore, the CSO sector continued to experience high levels of competition for prominence and funding, hindering cooperation among CSOs. However, an informal forum was established

in 2017 to coordinate and streamline international CSO programs; it has appointed a steering committee and meets regularly.

Management training is predominantly available in Colombo and provided to CSO staff on a short-term basis. Training is often too expensive for smaller CSOs. Training programs provided by international CSOs often target the delivery needs of specific programs, rather than the management needs of CSOs more broadly.

In 2017, some existing intersectoral partnerships between CSOs and the government, media, and local businesses strengthened. For example, the Mannar Women's Development Federation (MWDF) worked with the government on initiatives to increase the capacity of government officers to implement the RTI Act and OMP Act. Moreover, CSOs and certain media organizations worked together to oppose the Independent Council for News Media Standards Bill. CSR initiatives promoted private sector partnerships with local CSOs. For example, Dialog Axiata PLC launched a mobile application to combat gender-based violence in partnership with The Asia Foundation and Women in Need. On the other hand, partnerships between government and CSOs weakened in the context of OGP reform proposals, as described above.




## PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5

The public image of CSOs declined slightly in 2017 due to the negative portrayal of CSOs by prominent state actors, which received wide media coverage.

Despite state attempts to regulate the media, the increased media freedom following the 2015 political transition continued in 2017. Sri Lanka retained its rank of 141 out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom Index. In 2017, media coverage of CSO advocacy campaigns, initiatives, and statements critical of the government was widespread throughout the country. For example, in August, CSOs such as Puravesi Balaya and the National Movement for a Just Society publicly protested the government's lack of progress on constitutional reform and anti-corruption efforts. These statements were reported in newspapers with wide readership, such as *Lankadeepa*, *Daily Mirror*, and *Daily News*.

The president and other government officials increasingly made negative statements about rights-based CSOs in 2017. For instance, President Sirisena declared that “NGOs should not comment on matters relating to national



security.” His statement was made in response to CSOs’ call to hold members of the armed forces accountable for alleged human rights abuses and war crimes. Moreover, the president publicly criticized CSOs for filing “RTI requests to further their own agendas.” This critique was made shortly after Transparency International Sri Lanka filed an RTI request to obtain the president’s asset declaration. Additionally, the sitting minister of justice in June stated that “most NGOs act with objectives seriously detrimental to the national interests. They have become a hindrance to national reconciliation and religious harmony.” These statements were widely reported in the press and heightened suspicion of rights-based CSOs, particularly among communities in the South. CSOs felt that these statements significantly

damaged their credibility with the public.

Businesses view certain service-providing CSOs as potential partners in CSR initiatives to help fulfill some of their commitments related to the SDGs. However, businesses generally disregard CSOs as sources of expertise or credible information.

In the South, the public generally perceives rights-based CSOs and their related advocacy work as “foreign backed” and “Western,” rather than working for the nation and the public good. This sentiment leads many to disengage from the work of CSOs, making constituency building and fundraising difficult. Communities in the North and East view rights-based CSOs more favorably. Rights-based CSOs promote issues aligned with community interests in the North and East, such as power sharing and transitional justice. While there are no recent surveys on the topic, public perceptions of CSOs seem to have suffered following the widely publicized criticism of CSOs from the president and other officials. Service-providing CSOs tend to have more positive public perceptions across the country.

While some CSOs publicize their activities, they typically do not actively promote their public image. The use of social media remains largely limited to Colombo-based CSOs. Moreover, CSOs do not have formal codes of ethics. Typically, only larger and more visible CSOs, such as Environmental Foundation Limited and the Center for Policy Alternatives, publish annual reports.